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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior empirical work shows that IPOs generally earn positive excess first-day returns yet 
subsequently underperform.  Many researchers examine the determinants of post-first-day IPO 
success, however, these studies do not test for first-year IPO return predictability due to 
unavailability of pre-IPO data with which to predict first-year performance.  In this study we 
utilize strictly pre-IPO financial data manually obtained from corporate IPO registrations to 
predict the first-year post-IPO performance of health care firms.  We do so by utilizing firm size, 
free cash flows, discretionary accruals, and Altman’s Z.  Results suggest that each metric is a 
significant determinant of first-year raw cumulative and excess cumulative returns, and we are 
able to reliably identify which firms will be in the top and bottom performance quartiles 30 days, 6 
months, and 12 months after the IPO. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
nitial public offerings are a critical means for firms to gain access to needed capital.  Typically, in the 
United States, IPOs begin with the firm choosing an investment bank and then filing an S-1 registration 
statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  This registration contains information 
regarding the company’s history, business model, performance, and a wide range of accounting information.  The 
SEC examines the registration for accuracy and completeness and, if satisfied, declares the offer effective.  The 
investment bank then presents the company to institutional investors.  This typically occurs via a road show in which 
the managers attempt to sell the potential success of the company to those investors.  The prospective investors then 
provide feedback as to their level of interest at a variety of possible offer prices.  After gathering this information, 
the investment bank prices the offer, allocates shares, and exchange trading begins. 
 
 Historically, IPOs have been significantly underpriced.  That is, in first-day trading share prices tend to rise 
far above the offer price.  First-day returns in the 1990s averaged 21%, and in the early 2000s averaged 40% 
(Ljungqvist, 2007).  As billions of dollars have been left on the table, much academic literature has attempted to 
explain the underpricing phenomenon.  The most-well-developed set of literature deals with asymmetric 
information.  For example, Baron (1982) proposes that the investment banker is better informed about the capital 
market than is the issuer and develops a theoretical model in which the banker is compensated for this informational 
advantage partly via IPO underpricing.  Welch (1989) presents a signaling model in which high-quality firms 
underprice IPOs in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned offering.  Rock (1986) finds that if there exists a 
group of investors with information superior to that of the firm and other investors, then the firm must issue 
underpriced shares to gain the participation of uninformed investors.  Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model the IPO 
process as an auction constructed to induce asymmetrically informed investors to reveal what they know to the 
underwriter.  The end result is underpricing and first-day overperformance. 
 
 However, most studies also find that IPOs subsequently significantly underperform.  For example, Ritter 
(1991) finds that the first-day gains are subsequently more than offset by underperformance over the next three 
years.  This finding is consistent with investors being periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of 
young growing companies and firms taking advantage of these windows of opportunity.  Additionally, Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) show that on average IPO firms underperform relative to non-issuing firms for five years after the 
offering date. 
I 
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 Another related stream of literature examines the relationship between post-IPO accounting variables and 
post-IPO performance.  For example, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) examine the returns of IPOs in which issuers 
have unusually high discretionary accruals in the first year after the IPO.  They find that those firms that 
aggressively manage earnings display a three-year aftermarket return of 20% less than IPO issuers having the most 
conservative earnings management policies.  Chan, Cooney, Kim, and Singh (2008) also examine the effect of 
discretionary accounting accruals, but do so in conjunction with controls for underwriter reputation and venture 
capitalist backing.  They again find that those firms displaying the most aggressive earnings management 
underperform those with the most conservative. 
 
 However, each of these studies relies on post-IPO financial data to predict post-IPO performance.  Thus, 
there is a vacuum in the literature with respect to predicting the first-year success of IPOs.  Further, there exists an 
array of accounting variables that one could potentially use to attempt to predict first-year IPO returns.  Such 
financial data is contained in the registration or S-1 statement that each IPO firm files with the SEC.  In choosing 
which financial variables to model, in addition to Teoh et al. (1998) we look to Altman (1968) for guidance. 
 
 Altman proposes that a particular set of financial ratios are reliable predictors of the financial viability of 
corporations.  Specifically, Altman utilizes working capital/total assets, retained earnings/total assets, EBIT/total 
assets, market value of equity/book value of debt, and sales/total assets to generate an overall index, Z.  These ratios 
measure liquidity, cumulative profitability, asset productivity, solvency, and sales-generating ability.  Altman finds 
that there are highly significant differences in these ratios between firms that declare bankruptcy and those that do 
not; those having higher Z scores are less likely to declare bankruptcy.  In essence, Altman’s Z is a measure of 
overall firm financial health.  As such, Z scores may also yield important predictive information regarding post-IPO 
firm viability and financial performance.
1
  In addition to discretionary accruals and Altman’s Z, we also control for 
firm size and for free cash flows.  The latter variable may be important in identifying whether larger free cash flows 
are associated with greater agency problems (Jensen, 1986) or are instead an indicator of greater firm earning power.  
In this study we develop regression models that in part utilize discretionary accruals and Altman’s Z to predict the 
first-year returns of health care IPOs.  In Section II we discuss our data, in Section III we present results, and 
conclude in Section IV. 
 
II.  DATA 
 
 We obtain a list of IPOs from hoovers.com, which provides a description of the business operations of each 
firm that has filed an IPO registration with the SEC.  We search through each of Hoover’s IPO descriptions and 
identify all 276 health care-related IPOs from 1997 to 2008.  We limit ourselves to a single sector due to constraints 
in the ability to manually gather data, and choose health-care-related firms because the health care industry 
represents a large and rapidly growing sector of the US economy.  Once health care IPOs are identified, matching by 
CUSIP we manually obtain associated financial statements using Edgar Online, a service which provides access to 
each firm’s S-1 filing.  The S-1 contains the balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows, and statement 
of retained earnings for the vast majority of IPO firms.  These financials provide a picture of firm operations before 
the IPO that may be useful in predicting post-IPO performance. 
 
III.  RESULTS 
 
 We begin by plotting IPO returns in the 3-year post-IPO period (Figure 1).  The three variables shown are 
cumulative IPO returns and excess IPO returns (ER) based on value-weighted and equally-weighted market 
portfolios.
2
  We see that health care IPOs from 1997 – 2008 outperformed the market by a substantial margin on 
average.  The time frame we focus on is within the 12-month post-IPO span.  The mean cumulative value-weighted 
excess returns at the 1-month, 6-month, and 12-month post-IPO periods are 0.7%. 6.0%, and 7.3%, respectively.  
However, as Figure 2 illustrates, there are extreme differences between the top and bottom IPO performers during 
this time.  Below we utilize a set of logistic regression models to determine if we can predict whether a firm’s 
returns will fall into the top or bottom quartile of cumulative excess returns. 
                                                     
1 Chava and Jarrow (2004) find that firms most frequently declare bankruptcy two to three years after their IPO. 
2 Returns on value-weighted and equally-weighted market portfolios are obtained directly from the CRSP database. 
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Figure 1 – Cumulative IPO Returns 
This figure illustrates cumulative returns for all health-care-related IPOs from 1997 to 2008.  The solid line represents the cumulative buy-and-hold return 
while the dashed lines represent cumulative excess returns (ER) relative to CRSP value-weighted and equally-weighted indexes.    
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Figure 2 – Cumulative Value-Weighted IPO Excess Return Quartiles 
This plot shows the cumulative value-weighed excess IPO returns by quartile.  Value-weighted excess returns are calculated as cumulative returns minus CRSP 
value-weighted market portfolio returns.   
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 For use in these formal regression analyses, we calculate two potentially important predictive variables – 
Discretionary Accruals and Altman’s Z.  Prior research by Teoh et al. (1998) and Chan et al. (2008) shows that high 
discretionary accruals can be a proxy for aggressive earnings management, which is an indicator of poor post-IPO 
returns.  We follow Chan et al. in the construction of this variable and begin by calculating total accruals as: 
 
Total Accruals = (CA – Cash) – (CL – STD – TP) – DEP, (1) 
 
where CA is the change in current assets, Cash is the change in cash, CL is the change in current liabilities, 
STD is the change in short-term debt, TP is change in taxes payable, and DEP is depreciation and amortization 
expense.  We are forced to omit change in taxes payable, which is generally unavailable in S-1 registration 
statements. 
 
 To control for firm size we next estimate the expression: 
 
,
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where TA is the average of beginning and ending total assets, and then use the resulting parameter estimates to 
predict nondiscretionary accruals (NDA): 
 
  .ˆˆˆ 210 iiii TAPPESalesNDA   (3) 
 
Finally, we impute discretionary accruals (DA) is as: 
 
  .
iiii
TANDAAccruals TotalDA   (4) 
 
Our second derived variable is Altman’s Z, which is defined as: 
 
,0.16.03.34.12.1 54321 XXXXX  Z   (5) 
 
where X1 is working capital/total assets, X2 is retained earnings/total assets, X3 is earnings before interest expenses 
and taxes/total assets, X4 is market value of equity/book value of total liabilities, and X5 is sales/total assets.  Because 
market value of equity is unavailable pre-IPO, we substitute book value of equity in its place. 
 
 In addition to DA and Altman’s Z, we include two fundamental financial variables that are intended to 
capture the pre-IPO financial disposition of the firm.  We chose these variables based on their S-1 availability and 
subject to the constraints of a test for multicollinearity with DA and Altman’s Z.  The resulting variables include Log 
Assets, which potentially captures how well-established the firm is prior to its IPO, and Log Free Cash Flows which 
is an indicator of the ability of the firm to generate cash to sustain operations.  The goal is to use the combined set of 
variables to predict the success of IPOs in the first month, 6 months, and 12 months after issue.  Of the initial 276 
IPO firms, 35 lack one or more of the desired variables, leaving us with 241 observations. 
 
 Results of OLS regressions are shown in Table 1.  The dependent variable in Table 1A is Cumulative IPO 
Returns in the 30 day, 6-month, and 12-month post-IPO periods.  Log Free Cash Flows is correlated with 30-day 
post-IPO returns, indicating the prior ability to generate cash is an important determinant of first-month returns.  
Looking at the 6- and 12-month regressions, we see that pre-IPO assets are also positively correlated with 
Cumulative IPO Returns.  More importantly, we observe that pre-IPO Discretionary Accruals is negative and 
significant while pre-IPO Altman’s Z is positive and highly significant.  The former finding is consistent with Chan 
et al. (2008) and suggests that firms having managers that attempt to aggressively manage earnings subsequently 
perform poorly.  The latter demonstrates that Altman’s Z is not only a reliable predictor of firm bankruptcy, but is 
also highly correlated with first-year post-IPO returns.  As a robustness test we repeat the analysis utilizing 
Cumulative Value-Weighted Excess IPO Returns as the LHSV and obtain equivalent results (Table 1B). 
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Table 1A: Cumulative IPO Returns 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is Cumulative IPO Returns.  Discretionary 
Accruals is imputed based on the Chan et al. (2008) model. 
  30-Day  6-Month  12-Month 
 
 Estimate  p-Value  Estimate  p-Value  Estimate  p-Value 
Intercept  -0.471  0.044  -1.447  0.000  -1.494  0.000 
Log Assets  -0.001  0.967  0.034  0.086  0.038  0.037 
Log Free Cash Flows  0.029  0.063  0.044  0.012  0.044  0.007 
Discretionary Accruals  -0.013  0.467  -0.111  0.000  -0.162  0.000 
Altman’s Z  0.016  0.139  0.048  0.000  0.052  0.000 
             
r-Square  0.154  0.176  0.159 
 
Table 1B: Value-Weighted Excess IPO Returns 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is Cumulative Value-Weighted Excess IPO 
Returns, which represent cumulative IPO returns minus cumulative CRSP value-weighted market portfolio returns. 
  30-Day  6-Month  12-Month 
 
 Estimate  p-Value  Estimate  p-Value  Estimate  p-Value 
Intercept  -0.288  0.213  -1.268  0.000  -1.471  0.000 
Log Assets  -0.005  0.753  0.034  0.080  0.054  0.003 
Log Free Cash Flows  0.023  0.137  0.034  0.054  0.023  0.160 
Discretionary Accruals  0.000  0.998  -0.092  0.000  -0.140  0.000 
Altman’s Z  0.013  0.203  0.038  0.001  0.044  0.000 
             
r-Square  0.112  0.128  0.116 
 
 Next we utilize a set of logistic regressions to determine whether we can identify those firms that will be in 
the top vs. bottom quartile of IPO returns.  Estimates are presented in Tables 2A (Cumulative IPO Returns) and 2B 
(Cumulative Value-Weighted Excess IPO Returns).  Here we see that in the 6-month and 12-month periods after 
IPOs, high Free Cash Flows, conservative earnings management, and high Altman’s Z are associated with better-
performing firms. 
 
Table 2A: Logistic Cumulative IPO Return Estimates 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is Cumulative Returns Quartile, which 
takes a value of either four or one.  The model is constructed such that the probability of returns being in the 4th quartile is 
predicted. 
  30-Day  6-Month  12-Month 
 
 Estimate  p-Value  Estimate  p-Value  Estimate  p-Value 
Intercept  -11.639  0.065  -17.362  0.000  -10.384  0.000 
Log Assets  -0.181  0.661  0.197  0.400  -0.038  0.830 
Log Free Cash Flows  0.875  0.022  0.700  0.001  0.598  0.000 
Discretionary Accruals  -0.416  0.546  -1.781  0.000  -1.157  0.000 
Altman’s Z  0.406  0.188  0.927  0.000  0.556  0.000 
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Table 2B: Logistic Cumulative Excess IPO Return Estimates 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is Cumulative Excess Returns Quartile, 
which takes a value of either four or one.  The model is constructed such that the probability of returns being in the 4th quartile is 
predicted. 
  30-Day  6-Month  12-Month 
 
 Estimate  p-Value  Estimate  p-Value  Estimate  p-Value 
Intercept  -9.021  0.116  -12.476  0.000  -12.212  0.000 
Log Assets  0.101  0.774  0.130  0.594  0.316  0.083 
Log Free Cash Flows  0.383  0.213  0.544  0.005  0.325  0.024 
Discretionary Accruals  -0.331  0.463  -0.971  0.000  -1.114  0.000 
Altman’s Z  0.471  0.123  0.511  0.001  0.421  0.000 
 
 The goal is to use these parameters to estimate the probability that each firm’s post-IPO returns will be in 
the top or bottom quartile.  We must first estimate Yi*, firm i’s predicted returns quartile, and then apply a 
transformation to predict the probability (Probi) that firm i’s returns will be in the top post-IPO returns quartile.  We 
begin by estimating Yi* as: 
 
,ˆˆˆˆˆ* 43210 iiiii  ZsAltman'DAFlows Cash Free LogAssets LogY   (6) 
 
and then utilize the transformation: 
 
,
e1
e
*
*
i
i
Y
Y
iProb

  (7) 
 
to obtain that probability.  When Probi > 0.75, we assign that firm to the top expected performance quartile and 
when Probi < 0.25 we assign it to the bottom expected performance quartile.  We then calculate mean firm returns in 
each projected quartile and examine whether these two sets of observed returns are significantly different.  Test 
results are presented in Tables 3A and 3B. 
 
Table 3A: Cumulative IPO Return Predictability 
This table illustrates the Cumulative IPO Returns of those stocks predicted to be in the 4th and 1st quartile of returns based on the 
parameter estimates in Table 2A.  
  
First-Month 
 
6-Month 
 
1-Year 
Q4 Returns 
 
7.30%  25.37%  27.75% 
Q1 Returns 
 
-9.55%  -23.49%  -31.94% 
Difference 
 
16.85%  48.84%  59.68% 
p-Value 
 
0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
Table 3B: Cumulative Excess IPO Return Predictability 
This table illustrates the Cumulative Value-Weighted Excess IPO Returns of those stocks predicted to be in the 4th and 1st quartile 
of returns based on the parameter estimates in Table 2B.  
  
First-Month 
 
6-Month 
 
1-Year 
Q4 Returns 
 
8.24%  13.51%  24.93% 
Q1 Returns 
 
-12.86%  -28.26%  -34.11% 
Difference 
 
21.10%  41.77%  59.04% 
p-Value 
 
0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
 We see that it is possible to identify whether an IPO firm will perform better than its peers based on the 
utilized pre-IPO variables.  Over the first 30-day post-IPO period, the firms in the projected top-performing quartile 
have a cumulative return of 7.30% while those in the projected bottom-performing quartile return -9.55%.  The 
difference of 16.85% is highly significant.  Differences are even more pronounced in the 6-month and 12-month 
post-IPO periods.  Here, we observe that the difference between projected top- and bottom-performers is 48.84% 
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and 59.68%, respectively.  Similar results hold for cumulative excess IPO returns as shown in Table 3B.  While 
results are consistent and highly significant, we are cautious in that our dataset includes only IPOs of health-care 
related firms, and recognize that results may not necessarily generalize to other industries. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 In this paper we fill a gap in the extant IPO literature by formulating a method to predict first-year IPO 
returns utilizing pre-IPO financial data.  We begin by examining the first-year returns of health care IPOs and find 
that on average these IPOs outperform value- and equally-weighted market portfolios.  However, within this subset 
of firms there is a great deal of variability in returns; some significantly outperform while others underperform.  We 
find that after accounting for firm size and free cash flows, those firms that engage in aggressive earnings 
management by manipulating discretionary accruals tend to underperform. 
 
 We also show that Altman’s Z, which has previously been used as a determinant of the probability of 
corporate bankruptcy, is a reliable predictor of first-year post-IPO returns.  Utilizing Altman’s Z within logistic 
regression models, we predict the probability that each firm’s cumulative raw and cumulative excess returns will be 
in the top and bottom quartile of all IPO returns.  Results show that based on pre-IPO financial information we can 
identify which firms are likely to be most and least successful after the IPO, and the differences in stock returns 
between these firms ranges from 16.85% in the first post-IPO month to 59.68% in the 12 months following the IPO.  
While conclusions in this study are limited to health care IPOs, results may generalize, and one opportunity for 
future research is to expand upon this finding to determine whether Altman’s Z is a reliable predictor of IPO returns 
in other sectors. 
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